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 Non-technical summary 
In order to give an answer to the question of whether personal entrepreneurial 
experience promotes firm survival, or is rather, to quote Oscar Wilde, “a most 
vicious and limited circle”, this paper provides a close examination of how firm 
survival depends on experience. It analyzes how successful firms are in which at 
least one ex-entrepreneur who abandoned a business previously (so called ‘re-
starters’) participates, i.e. how they differ in their risk of failure compared to 
other firms. In this regard, it is of particular interest whether entrepreneurs learn 
their lesson from their previous business failure. There are several theoretical 
arguments and mechanisms which come into the analysis of this issue. A posi-
tive impact of entrepreneurial experience on firm survival can be derived from 
the human capital theory. This expected effect is therefore expressed in the first 
hypothesis. The idea of learning mechanisms induced by negative experience 
would lead us to expect failure experience to affect firm survival positively, too. 
This expectation is set down in the second hypothesis. 
For the survival analysis, this study makes use of the ZEW Foundation Panel. 
The panel is the result of a co-operation between the Centre for European Eco-
nomic Research (ZEW) and Creditreform, which is the largest German credit 
rating agency. The size of Creditreform means that their data on enterprises in 
Germany is the most comprehensive available. Creditreform has provided the 
data in semi-annual waves since 1989. The ZEW Foundation Panel contains in-
formation about three million start-ups which occurred between 1990 and 2005. 
The unit of registration is the company itself rather than any subsidiaries, i.e. this 
investigation is based on original foundation events and ignores affiliated foun-
dations. 
The analysis herein addresses the question of whether personal entrepreneu-
rial experience promotes firm survival respectively lowers a firm’s risk of clo-
sure. The question can even be understood as: does entrepreneurial experience 
affect the probability of business failure? Not every firm closure can be consid-
ered as a business failure. Thus, failures have been disentangled from the total 
number of firm closures and analyzed separately. Two types of failure types can 
be identified: bankruptcy and the voluntary closure of a firm in financial distress. 
The results of the analyses suggest that experiences indicating success have no 
great effects on the risk of failing with a restart. Contrarily, negative experience, 
i.e. previous entrepreneurial failure, raises the risk of failing again. This means 
that the hypotheses – that experience initiates learning and thus more success – 
must be rejected. In particular, the assumption that experience of failure induces 
higher-level learning is dismissed as the opposite is found to be true: failure ex-
perience increases the risk of further failure. 
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Introduction 
Firm formation is seen as a strong force behind economic growth (Kirchhoff 
1994; Reynolds 1994, 1999; Wennekers and Thurik 1999). Early analyses for 
Germany were unable to validate this view (Audretsch and Fritsch 1994; Fritsch 
1996) but during the 1990’s it became more and more evident (Audretsch and 
Fritsch 2003). Firm closures are the counterpart of firm formation and are no less 
relevant. Production factors tied up in existing firms need to be released before 
they can be reallocated. However, this is the macroeconomic view. In microeco-
nomics firm survival is often used as a measure of success and firm closure taken 
to be synonymous with failure. 
The survival of a firm is influenced by several factors. Some, like economic 
conditions within a region or industry, affect all firms similarly (Audretsch 1991; 
Brüderl et al. 1992; Stearns et al. 1995). Other factors are firm-specific, like the 
firm’s age or its size at the time of foundation (Audretsch and Mahmood 1995; 
Brüderl et al. 1992; Mata 1995). Some of the impacts are generally accepted and 
are stylized as ‘liability of smallness’, ‘liability of newness’, or ‘liability of ado-
lescence’ (Brüderl and Schüßler 1990; Mahmood 2000; Stinchcombe 1965). But 
even if such relationships are certain, a firm’s development actually depends on 
the decisions of its managers and, thus, on their specific skills. Hence, the entre-
preneur’s human capital should be a highly relevant success factor.  
Human capital is built up by learning. Possible ways of learning considered 
here are schooling, vocational education, or professional experience (Becker 
1985; Mincer 1974). Experience is a particularly important source of learning as 
learning means to solve problems and so necessarily involves activity (Arrow 
1962). Entrepreneurial knowledge and skills are thus best acquired by experienc-
ing entrepreneurship, i.e. from being an entrepreneur. A typical means of meas-
uring entrepreneurial experience is to track previous self-employment episodes 
or previous firm ownership. However, this approach only captures a very general 
kind of entrepreneurial experience as the reality of entrepreneurship is not that 
simple. Such experience is heterogeneous: at the very least it can be divided di-
chotomously into ‘good’ experience and ‘bad’ experience. In this simple binary 
classification, good experience is likely to be associated with success and bad 
experience with failure. Nevertheless, a business failure might be useful: making 
mistakes is supposed to be the predominant source of learning for small business 
entrepreneurs (Gibb 1997). It is even suggested that bad experience initiates a 
superior kind of learning (Chialvo and Bak 1999; Cope 2005). Such arguments 
are often voiced in discussions about previously failed entrepreneurs. Yet they 
are rarely, if ever, tested against empirical data. 
The analysis herein addresses the question of whether personal entrepreneu-
rial experience promotes firm survival or, to be more precise, lowers a firm’s risk 
of closure. The question can even be understood as: does entrepreneurial experi-
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ence affect the probability of business failure? Not every firm closure can be 
considered as a business failure. Thus, failures have been disentangled from the 
total number of firm closures and analyzed separately. Two types of failure types 
can be identified: bankruptcy and the voluntary closure of a firm in financial 
distress. The results of the analyses suggest that experiences indicating success 
lower the risk of failing with a restart. Contrarily, negative experience, i.e. previ-
ous entrepreneurial failure, raises the risk of failing again. This means that the 
hypotheses – that experience initiates learning and thus more success – must be 
rejected. In particular, the assumption that experience of failure induces higher 
level learning is dismissed as the opposite is found to be true: failure experience 
increases the risk of further failure. 
Theoretical perspectives 
The survival analysis herein focuses on effects arising from entrepreneurial 
experience – particularly effects arising from failure experience. It is therefore 
necessary to disentangle failure experience from each entrepreneur’s body of 
experience. This is not easy to do on the basis of the observable facts. What is 
observable is if and how an entrepreneur previously abandoned a firm. From this 
one can distinguish four cases: (1) the entrepreneur has not previously partici-
pated in a firm, (2) the entrepreneur is still a participant in a firm founded at an 
earlier date, (3) the entrepreneur has ceased to participate a firm which is cur-
rently still a going concern, or (4) a previous venture on the part of the entrepre-
neur was closed down. Based on these states a previous business failure can only 
be assumed in the latter case, i.e. if a venture was actually closed. But even in the 
case of closure it is difficult to detect a business failure. In reality, “the definition 
of failure used has, to a large extent, depended on the nature of the data avail-
able” (Everett and Watson 1998, p. 374). 
One way to define failure is to use an objective measure, such as bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy is a technical term meaning financially difficult situations like an 
inability to pay creditors or excessive debts, and is thus attributable to objective 
and concrete factors. Personal bankruptcies, i.e. bankruptcies for individuals 
rather than for business entities, are relevant when the entrepreneurs are sole 
proprietors or entrepreneurs in liberal professions. But legally forced involuntary 
closures due to bankruptcy are not the only type of closure. There are also ‘vol-
untary’ firm closures. The reasons for voluntary closures are not obvious and can 
be diverse. For example, an entrepreneur might choose to close his or her busi-
ness in order to avoid bankruptcy, to go back to employment, to go into retire-
ment, to make a clean break and open a different business, or due to other sub-
jective motives.  
Owing to the wide range of reasons for closure, additional information has to 
be used to disentangle business failures from the set of voluntary firm closures. 
Smith (1987) points out that signals from the payment behavior of buyers can 
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normally be used by sellers to identify financially strong firms, and that “the 
screening process is effective in sorting if it is sufficiently more costly for high 
default-risk buyers to signal financial health than low default-risk buyers” (Smith 
1987, p. 868). Therefore, information about the firms’ payment behavior is 
brought into the analysis. This can be used to distinguish between firms which 
keep to the payment terms or exceed them only occasionally, and other firms. 
This approach allows the detection of latent failures among the voluntary clo-
sures by looking for deteriorated payment behavior, which firms are likely to 
exhibit before closures that are officially voluntarily but actually economically 
forced, for example to avoid bankruptcy. Due to the lack of additional data, 
bankruptcy and the voluntary closure of a distressed firm are the only definitions 
of failure which can be considered. Of course, other Entrepreneurs, for example 
those who close a firm because they don’t achieve their targets, might also be 
considered as having failed. 
As summarized in Table 1, there are four experience indicators introduced in 
the survival analysis, which classify the entrepreneurs by their most recent pre-
vious venture: (1) restarters who left a firm by the way of sale of shareholdings, 
(2) restarters who voluntarily closed a financially sound firm, (3) those who vol-
untarily closed a financially distressed firm and (4) restarters who went bankrupt. 
The first two restart types can be considered as having something like entrepre-
neurial success experience, while the latter two restart types indicate failure ex-
perience. 
Table 1: Experience measures 
Exit experience due to… Definition Indicator stands for… 
Sale of shareholdings Entrepreneurs abandoned a previous business by the sale of their shareholdings. Success 
Closure/liquidation of finan-
cially sound firm 
Entrepreneurs abandoned a previous business by the 
closure/liquidation of the firm. The firm is assessed to 
have been in a financially sound situation. 
Success 
Closure/liquidation of finan-
cially distressed firm 
Entrepreneurs abandoned a previous business by the 
closure/liquidation of the firm. The firm is assessed to 
have been in a financially distressed situation. 
Failure 
Bankruptcy Entrepreneurs abandoned a previous business due to bankruptcy of the firm. Failure 
   
Previously failed restarters can be denoted as ‘determined entrepreneurs’ be-
cause they closed their firms for financial reasons but are not discouraged by this 
experience (Stokes and Blackburn 2001). There is another type of experienced 
entrepreneurs: so called portfolio entrepreneurs. They found or participate in a 
new business while they are still involved in an existing firm. Hence, portfolio 
entrepreneurs do not fit the definition of restarters because they lack the funda-
mental requirement of closure. They are therefore not taken into consideration. 
Additionally, they are different from restarters or serial entrepreneurs in many 
ways. They differ in their whole attitude to entrepreneurship, i.e. the reasons 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE: A MOST VICIOUS AND LIMITED CIRCLE!? 4 
behind their ambition to start up or grow a business (Westhead and Wright 
1998). Including portfolio entrepreneurs in the present consideration would mean 
moving too far from the central focus of this paper 
Derivation of hypotheses 
As discussed above, the survival of a firm depends on many factors. Never-
theless, the capability of the entrepreneur to make the right decisions should play 
an important role for a firm’s success. An individual’s human capital is a meas-
ure for this capability: the higher her/his human capital the more likely an entre-
preneur is to do a better job. This effect is suggested by the human capital theory. 
The theory hypothesizes that investment in skills through formal educational 
attainment, on-the-job training or professional experience increases the produc-
tivity of workers (Becker 1985; Mincer 1974). Yet the theory need not be limited 
to employees. It is similarly appropriate when applied to entrepreneurs, to ex-
plain differences in the success of businesses. Experience of self-employment 
enhances entrepreneurship-specific human capital and increases the individual’s 
ability to manage a firm well. Only this indirect effect of entrepreneurial experi-
ence on firm survival can be derived based on the original human capital theory. 
Cressy (1996) developed a more purposeful model based on the model of en-
trepreneurial choice (Evans and Jovanovic 1989). The model of entrepreneurial 
choice regards the decision to enter self-employment as dependent on expected 
future returns, which are related to the decision-maker’s human capital. In 
Cressy’s variety, human capital has a direct effect as it is used in modeling the 
utility of both self-employment and wage employment. Following his model, 
experience increases the probability of making the most of self-employment, 
through a process of entrepreneurial learning. As a consequence, it improves 
survival. Indeed, ex-entrepreneurs who embark on a new entrepreneurial venture 
should have learned from their experience otherwise they wouldn’t return (Stam 
et al. 2006). Learning effects are also suggested by Chialvo and Bak (1999) who 
simply conclude: “If an adaptive system [novice entrepreneurs in this context] is 
placed in a new environment, or otherwise subjected to learn something new, the 
likelihood of making mistakes is generally larger than the chance to be initially 
right” (Chialvo and Bak 1999, p. 1139). 
Enhanced human capital based on specific experience also lowers the nega-
tive effects of what Van den Steen (2004) calls ‘choice-driven over-optimism’. 
This refers to the basic range of alternatives an individual has. From a set of al-
ternatives, they choose the one that promises the most success. The actual choice 
made is, nevertheless, the one about which they are also most optimistic – fre-
quently over-optimistic. This drives the probability of failure. The choice bias 
“tends to disappear with sufficient experience with the particular choice prob-
lem” (Van den Steen 2004, p.2). This enables experienced entrepreneurs to as-
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sess the success prospects of new ventures more realistically than novices, i.e. 
first time entrepreneurs, and should result in a lowered risk of failure.  
However, the importance of human capital is not limited to established busi-
ness, but also plays a role in its pre-start-up phase. Highly educated individuals 
have advantages in opening a business as they are, for example, more likely than 
others to be in a position to get adequate financing (Åstebro and Bernhardt 2003; 
Cressy 1996). Entrepreneurship-specific human capital, i.e. experience, strength-
ens these advantages. Experienced entrepreneurs often follow ‘role models’, i.e. 
they are inspired by other entrepreneurs they know (Stam et al. 2006; Wagner 
2003). Hence, ex-entrepreneurs are still insiders in the entrepreneurial commu-
nity, enabling them to profit from their contacts. Westhead et al. (2005) argue 
that they can avoid the time-consuming establishment of business relations, as 
these already exist. Such existing business relations can be compared to superior 
start-up conditions (Åstebro and Bernhardt 2003; Brüderl et al. 1996), which 
heighten a firm’s prospects of success (Geroski et al. 2003). Additionally, task-
related experience leads to more knowledgeable actions and decisions (Reuber 
and Fischer 1999). Ex-entrepreneurs can therefore identify promising business 
opportunities more easily (Dutta and Crossan 2005; Ucbasaran et al. 2003). 
Compared to novices they thus have advantages when it comes to taking their 
chances. 
A further reason why experienced entrepreneurs are likely able to assess the 
success prospects of new ventures more realistically is that experience leaves 
somatic markers which play a prominent role in decision processes (Bechara and 
Damasio 2005). Somatic markers improve intuition. Decisions that are similar to 
tasks already encountered can be tackled better. Novices cannot benefit from 
previous decisions, they “cannot rely on behavior and habit if they intend on 
surviving […] they must learn through their experience […]” (Corbett 2005, p. 
482). Entrepreneurial learning, for the most part, comes from individuals’ own 
experience, i.e. ‘learning-by-doing’ or, in other words, learning from repeated 
behavior (Cope and Watts 2000). Such behavioral learning is mainly adaptive 
and its ability to modify routines depends on the outcome of the previous experi-
ence (Lumpkin and Lichtenstein 2005). The outcome of previous events deter-
mines the mode by which experience is transformed into knowledge (Politis 
2005). That is, previous success results in a different type of learning than previ-
ous failure. While it is more likely that success stabilizes routines, failure may 
disrupt them, triggering modes of higher-order learning (Cope 2005). Chandler 
(1996) illustrates this by an anecdote from a previously successful entrepreneur 
who failed with a new firm in spite of applying the same “formula” that made 
the first business succeed. 
Chialvo and Bak (1999) even regard learning as a purely mistake-driven proc-
ess. They argue that only negative reinforcement helps in making progress while 
positive reinforcement can even reduce the ability to adapt. Even if, ideally, 
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higher-order learning should be initialized by “intelligent failures” which “have 
large enough outcomes to attract attention, and small enough outcomes to avoid 
negative responses” (Politis 2005, p. 411), it is frequently triggered by stressful 
business failures. In such cases learning might be painful and traumatic and as-
sociated with psychological blows that question the entrepreneur’s perceptions 
of himself or herself (see Cope 2005 or Ucbasaran et al. 2006 for a compilation 
of relevant citations). However, if failure causes entrepreneurs to reflect on what 
happened, it contributes to avoiding reoccurrence. This might explain why many 
successful entrepreneurs regard failure as a crucial aspect of their experience 
(Politis 2005). Owing to this, business failure experience should improve the 
ability to avoid distress in future. 
There is also a selection mechanism which should actually “breed” a positive 
selection out of all renascent entrepreneurs. Many entrepreneurs are not yet able 
to cope with the tasks of establishing a business and therefore relinquish their 
plans in the pre-start-up phase. This selection mechanism is stronger in the case 
of previously failed entrepreneurs. Some of them learn through the business fail-
ure that they are not entrepreneurially minded and drop out of entrepreneurship 
(Jovanovic 1982). Furthermore, they need to get over their grief about the loss of 
the business (Sheperd 2003) and have to convince their principals that the ven-
ture project is promising and well thought out – despite their previous failure. 
Novice or previously successful entrepreneurs are not faced with such hardships 
if they want to (re-)establish. Thus, of all entrepreneurs who have experienced 
business failure and are making serious attempts to venture again, only a deter-
mined elite will withstand the pre-start-up phase. 
The theoretical arguments suggest very clearly that the effect of entrepreneu-
rial experience on firm success should be positive. Yet the empirical findings are 
ambiguous. There are opposing findings across the whole range of success 
measures: with regard to firm profits Brüderl et al. (1996) found negative experi-
ence effects, while the results of Bosma et al. (2000) are inconsistent with their 
claim that experienced entrepreneurs make higher profits. Referring to the em-
ployment stock Metzger (2006) found higher growth as a result of experience 
while Kay et al. (2004) or Brüderl et al. (1996) deny such an effect. With regard 
to firm survival the findings are similarly ambiguous: Taylor (1999) or Headd 
(2001) show that experience heightens the probability of survival while others 
contradict any relationship between entrepreneurial experience and firm survival 
(Brüderl et al. 1992; Van Praag 2003). 
With regard to the business success of previously failed entrepreneurs, the 
empirical evidence is more scarce but just as ambiguous: results of descriptive 
comparisons suggest positive impacts of failure experience on firms’ employ-
ment and turnover growth (BCG 2002). Using multinomial analyses on survey 
data Kay et al. (2004) find no significant impact on employment growth, while 
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the results of Metzger (2006) reveal significantly negative effects of failure ex-
perience  (concretely: of bankruptcy experience) on firm growth. 
To sum up, two hypotheses can be derived from the theoretical considera-
tions: 
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial experience enables entrepre-
neurs to make decisions which lead to a decreased risk of fail-
ure compared to novice entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurial failure experience enables en-
trepreneurs to make decisions which lead to a decreased risk of 
failure compared to novice entrepreneurs and to entrepreneurs 
who do not have such experience. 
Applied data 
For the survival analysis, this study makes use of the ZEW Foundation Panel 
(see Almus et al. 2000 for details). The panel is the result of a co-operation be-
tween the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) and Creditreform, 
the largest German credit rating agency. Due to the size of Creditreform their 
data on enterprises in Germany is the most comprehensive available. Creditre-
form has provided the data in semi-annual waves since 1989. For the period from 
1990 until 2005 the ZEW Foundation Panel contains information about three 
million start-ups. The unit of registration is the company itself rather than any 
subsidiaries, i.e. this investigation is based on original foundation events and 
ignores affiliated foundations. Creditreform uses three sources of information for 
collecting their data: (1) official sources of information like the trade register, 
registers of societies and associations, the land register etc., (2) general sources 
of information about enterprises like press releases, balance sheets and company 
reports etc., and finally (3) internal sources of information, i.e. active research in 
the form of enquiries about individual firms or for marketing purposes, control 
queries etc. (Egeln et al. 1999). 
Relying on these sources of information means that particularly very small 
firms and entrepreneurs in liberal professions are underrepresented in the data 
(Fritsch et al. 2002; Harhoff and Steil 1997). Firms trading in liberal professions 
are excluded from the analyses. Liberal professions are occupations that require 
special training in the liberal arts or sciences, for example lawyers, notaries, en-
gineers, architects, doctors and accountants. Actually, they are not comparable 
with other entrepreneurs because self-employment in liberal professions is dif-
ferent from entrepreneurial self-employment. The former is rather focused on the 
individual, who earns his or her living by supplying “superior” services and em-
ploys few assistants, if any. Entrepreneurship on the other hand is a more com-
prehensive type of self-employment comprising business establishment, hiring of 
employees, withstanding competition etc. However, even considering that small 
firms are underrepresented in the data and liberal professions are disregarded, 
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more than half of the recorded firms are very small firms, i.e. are firms of sole 
entrepreneurs without employees. 
The data contains general information about the firms like name and address, 
date of foundation, industry affiliation, or the number of employees. Further-
more, it reports dates of occurrences related to closure, like bankruptcies or reg-
ister deletions. While bankruptcies have to be made public and thus will cer-
tainly be recognized, by no means all voluntary firm closures can be identified 
from register deletions. However, Creditreform provide information about how 
up-to-date the data available in each wave are. From this information, it is possi-
ble to draw conclusions about the firms’ survival status, i.e. if business activities 
have been terminated between two waves, and to approximate the date of a vol-
untary firm closure accordingly.1 Beside the information about the firms, the 
data also contains details about the entrepreneurs involved in these ventures. The 
entrepreneurial activities of these entrepreneurs have been observed longitudi-
nally, which allows for the identification of those persons who have established 
one or more companies. Due to the belief that the influence of single entrepre-
neurs is strongest in smaller enterprises, the analysis concentrates on firms of a 
start-up size of less than 10 employees. Following data preparation, the sample 
comprises about 345,000 firms founded since 1995. Eleven founding cohorts, i.e. 
from 1995 up to 2005, are involved in the survival analysis, which considers the 
survival of the firms from the year of foundation up to the end of 2005. 
In order to give an impression of the firms included in the sample some mean 
characteristics are shown in Table 2. At least one restarter was initially involved 
in about 5 percent of all firms. Most of these experiences, i.e. 43 percent of all 
cases, come from entrepreneurs who restarted after a sale of shareholdings. A 
further 21 percent of the experience supply can be attributed to restarters who 
closed their sound firms voluntarily. The remaining experience consists of busi-
ness failure, and thus of voluntarily closure of financially distressed firms (12 
percent) or previous bankruptcy (25 percent). Within-industry experience is pre-
sent in about 16 percent of the experienced firms, and 19 percent of them are 
provided with multiple experiences, in that at least one of the founders previ-
ously had an ownership share in more than one firm. 
The initial economic situation seems to be slightly in favor of novice firms. 
Fourteen percent of the firms founded by novice entrepreneurs pay their bills 
within the payment terms or exceed them only marginally. This is a better pay-
ment practice than experienced entrepreneurs show: only 10 percent of them 
keep their terms. Besides, Creditreform advises caution with regard to business 
dealings with about 7 percent of start-ups from novice entrepreneurs and with 15 
percent of the experienced firms. Furthermore, about 7 percent of the novice 
firms are backed with university knowledge, which is 11 percentage points less 
than in the case of the experienced firms. That is, graduate entrepreneurs seem to 
be more prone to reestablish than others. In terms of age structure, a higher share 
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of older entrepreneurs is found in the group of experienced firms compared to 
novice firms. This is not surprising – even if a higher share of entrepreneurs 
whose age is unclear biases the structure of the latter. Novice entrepreneurs tend 
to establish firms alone rather than in an entrepreneurial team, as the compara-
tively low share of team foundations suggests. About 15 percent of these firms 
are multi-owned, compared to 24 percent of the experienced firms. 
Table 2: Mean values of start-up characteristics 
Start-up characteristics All firms 
Firms founded 
by novice 
entrepreneurs 
Firms founded 
by experienced 
entrepreneurs 
Exit experience   
 Sale of shareholdings 2.2 -  42.7
 Voluntary closure of sound firm 1.1 -  21.1
 Voluntary closure of distressed firm 0.6 -  11.5
 Bankruptcy 1.3 -  25.4
Entrepreneurial within industry experience 0.8 -  16.0
Multiple entrepreneurial experiences 0.9 -  18.6
Initial economic situation b   
 Payment behavior (indicator: good) 13.7 13.9  10.4
 Financial standing (indicator: care is advisable) 7.4 7.0  14.8
University degree 7.3 6.7  17.4
Education unknown 68.2 69.5  43.9
Age of entrepreneur(s) a   
 Younger than 30 19.2 19.7  10.3
 30 to 39 years 33.4 33.4  33.5
 40 to 49 years 18.9 18.4  27.9
 50 to 59 years 6.9 6.6  12.8
 60 and older 1.7 1.6  3.8
 Age unknown 26.4 26.6  22.7
Team foundation 15.3 14.8  23.5
Number of employees at start-up (median) 1.9 (1) 1.8 (1) 2.2 (1) 
Legal form (limited liability) 22.9 22.0  40.8
Closure of financially sound firm 7.3 7.4  4.8
Failure 1 (bankruptcy) 10.3 10.2  11.9
Failure 2 (financially forced ‘voluntary’ closure) 9.0 9.2  6.3
a There can be more than one indication per firm. 
b Appraisal provided by Creditreform. 
c T-tests on mean differences between firms founded by novices and firms founded by experienced entrepreneurs show 
significant differences at p < 0.1 for the share of all characteristics apart from being in the thirties. 
Source: ZEW Foundation Panel.
Half of the firms employ only the entrepreneur at foundation, as indicated by 
median of the start-up size. Although the median is the same for experienced 
firms, they provide a workplace for one additional person on average when they 
found a firm. Twenty-two percent of the novice firms choose legal forms with 
unlimited liability, which is almost 20 percentage points less than for firms 
founded by experienced entrepreneurs. Without looking at any specific entry 
year, 26 percent of the firms close during the observation period. More than a 
third of these closures are bankruptcies, i.e. less than two thirds are voluntary 
firm closures. Of the firm exits regarded as business failures, there is an almost 
equal number of financially forced voluntary closures and bankruptcies. While 
this pattern is similar in the group of novice firms, there is a distinctive differ-
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ence for the experienced firms. There the share of bankruptcies is almost twice 
the share of financially forced voluntary closures. 
Half of all voluntary closures of sound firms happen within 32 months of es-
tablishment (not reported in any table). Referring to bankruptcies, the time by 
failure distribution differs between novice and experienced firms. Half of the 
novice firms that go bankrupt file to open proceedings during the first 37 months 
after foundation. This period is shorter in the case of experienced firms; half of 
them file for bankruptcy within only 30 months. Ignoring the relative number of 
bankruptcies in each category, one might conclude that experience helps entre-
preneurs see economic reason and file for bankruptcy earlier than novices. The 
time by failure distribution of financially forced ‘voluntary’ firm closures is uni-
form again. About 18 months elapse before half of the closures take place. 
Testing the hypotheses 
In order to account for the large range of important factors that may affect a 
firm’s risk of closure, the analysis uses two types of data: individual information 
and firm information. The values of the covariates refer to the times when the 
firms were founded except the measures, which are applied to describe the firm’s 
management. These variables are modeled in a time-varying manner, as when 
relevant entrepreneurs leave or start participating in a firm during the observation 
period the management characteristics can change. Measures concerned by this 
are the four indicators accounting for the way by which previous entrepreneurial 
experience was gained (i.e. whether the restart took place after a sale of share-
holdings, a voluntary closure of a financially distressed firm, a voluntary closure 
of a financially sound firm, or after bankruptcy). Furthermore, the other experi-
ence measures, namely within-industry experience2 and multiple3 entrepreneurial 
experiences, as well as the formal education measure, the age variables, and the 
team indicator are introduced as time-varying covariates. 
The experience measures as the main explanatory variables are applied in or-
der to test the hypotheses, with a lack of success being indicated by failure ex-
perience. Within-industry experience is a measure that is more closely related to 
specific knowledge and multiple experiences indicate inter-business learning and 
thus enlarged entrepreneurial knowledge. Finally, an indicator for graduates is 
introduced, which accounts for the possible effects of human capital from higher 
education. 
Several control variables are applied. These measures are necessary to take 
out side effects of factors that influence survival but are not in the focus of the 
analysis, including firm information and economic founding conditions. The 
most probable and the most important control variables are the two indicators 
regarding the initial economic situation of the firms. The measures are appraisals 
provided by Creditreform. The first indicator, namely payment behavior, account 
for firms that on average kept to their payment terms, signaling reliability , 
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which helps to build up lasting business relations. The second measure is finan-
cial standing. A bad financial standing curtails a firm’s capability for growth and 
thus also for survival, because it impedes the acquisition of financial means. Be-
sides these economic indicators there are also other covariates, for example, the 
age structure of the entrepreneurs involved in the firms that is important because 
the entrepreneur’s current position in life can affect his closure behavior. In rec-
ognition of resource-based approaches, a team indicator is also introduced. A 
team of managing proprietors should be able to supply above-average resources 
like financial means or human capital. The start-up size also matters: on the one 
hand, a small workforce might be a bottleneck, restricting the capacity to take 
orders; but on the other each employee is a relevant cost factor – even one too 
many might overstretch a new firm’s financial means. One main characteristic of 
a firm is its legal form, which can be put into the binary categories of limited and 
unlimited liability legal forms. The choice of a limited liability legal form is as-
sociated with demands like minimum margins on the capital stock or particular 
disclosure requirements. It is thus a kind of quality measure for uninformed 
business partners. Yet it affects the risk taking behavior of a firm’s management 
and thus the development of the venture. If there is a liability limitation, manag-
ing proprietors might be encouraged to approve projects that involve excessive 
risks. The effects of trading under a limited liability legal form on firm success 
are indisputable but ambiguous. Thus, a measure is introduced in order to ac-
count for the effects of limited liability legal forms.  
Finally, control measures for industry affiliation, for site selection in terms of 
distinguishing between East- and West-Germany and for the year of establish-
ment are introduced. This is relevant due to specific conditions arising from 
these characteristics, such as the level of necessary capital commitments, the 
strength and structure of competition, different federal state politics, or other 
particular conditions. These latter control measures are not reported in the esti-
mation results table. 
The indicators concerning the education and age of the involved entrepre-
neurs are not completely available for all of the firms in the sample. In order to 
preserve a maximum number of observations a missing-value-indicator approach 
is therefore applied (Cohen and Cohen 1983). The approach is to generate two 
dummy variables, which indicates missing values of education and age. At the 
same time, the missing values are filled up with numeric values. 
Estimation method 
In survival analysis, one is mostly interested in evaluating the risk or hazard 
of failure that an object is faced with at a specific time. This type of analysis is 
widely used in medicine or in engineering, for example with humans and ma-
chines as the ‘objects’ and death and breakdown as the ‘failures’. In economics 
survival analysis has become firmly established in evaluating firm survival, as is 
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the case here. An approach often used in analyzing survival data is to apply the 
Cox proportional hazard model introduced by Cox (1972). In his approach Cox 
devised the hazard function h(t|xj) as a log-linear function of time-dependent 
baseline hazard and individual-specific instruments. The hazard function is writ-
ten as 
( ) ( ) ( )xjj xthxth βexp| 0=  
where t is time, x a vector of covariates and βx a coefficient vector. 
The baseline hazard h0(t) varies with time but is independent of any individu-
alistic parameters. Since the baseline hazard is equal for all subjects, there is no 
need to specify its shape, so the approach is flexible and easy to compute. The 
covariates work as factors of proportionality, that is, they are presumed simply to 
shift the baseline hazard curve up or down with the same impact at each point in 
time. This functionalism is formulated as the proportional hazard (PH) assump-
tion, which is the key assumption in the Cox model. It follows from this assump-
tion that the hazard of a subject i can be computed by multiplication with the 
hazard of subject j. Or, to put it another way, the hazard ratio, which is the quota 
of hazard rates between the hazards of subjects i and j, is constant over time 
( )( ) ( )[ ]jiTxjj ii xxxth xth −= βexp|| . 
The invariance of covariate effects over time is a very strong presumption. It 
is easy to violate this assumption since it reasonable that initial effects of time-
constant covariates actually vanish over time. There are several methods to test 
whether the PH-assumption holds. Doing so with regard to the covariates intro-
duced reveals no serious violation of the assumption.4 At least, the Cox likeli-
hood function to be maximized in its simplest form can be derived as 
( ) ∏ ∑= ∈ ⎟
⎟
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⎞
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where k is the number of the distinct points in time at which failures occur. 
The closure probability analysis is performed sequentially, with each step 
considering a more disaggregated closure type. A first regression (model A) in-
cludes all exit types as exit events, independent of closure conditions. All types 
of exit are thus considered equivalent in meaning. Model B uses the firm failures 
as exit events. Voluntary closures that do not indicate failure are treated as cen-
sored values. Introduced by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), such an approach is 
used in several studies (Harhoff et al. 1998; Kay 1986; Narendranathan and 
Stewart 1991; Taylor 1999). In model C bankruptcy is disentangled from the 
failure type aggregate and is thus considered as a competing risk to the other 
types of closure. The alternative closure events are treated as censored in this 
specification. For a summary of the estimated models, see Table 3. 
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What can we learn from a comparison of the separate specifications? Model 
A can give an indication of how firms with a higher probability of closure are 
characterized. Results of the single failure risk specification, model B, further 
reveal which firms fail to a higher degree, that is more often suffer fatal financial 
distress, independent of whether they be legally forced to do so or not. The sepa-
ration of bankruptcy also enables us to identify differences in the effects if only 
an objective type of failure is considered. 
Table 3: Overview of the estimation specifications 
Specification Observations treated as closures Observations treated as censored 
Model A All firms which were closed. All firms active at the end of the year 
2005 
Model B All firms which failed, i.e. those which were either voluntarily 
closed due to financial distress or went bankrupt 
All firms active at the end of the year 
2005 
Firms voluntarily closed without being 
in financial distress 
Model C Firms which went bankrupt All firms active at the end of the year 
2005 
All firms voluntarily closed 
   
Estimation results 
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the Cox regressions. It displays the 
estimated coefficients, robust standard errors, and the 95 percent confidence in-
tervals that result from maximizing the Cox log-likelihood function. The latter 
are displayed due to the large number of observations introduced in the regres-
sions, which cause increased test statistic values leading to many highly signifi-
cant results. Readers should have the chance to come to their own conclusions 
about the meaningfulness of the claimed effects (Cohen 1994). 
Model A refers to the single risk specification in which all exit types are 
pooled. Firms in which at least one of the entrepreneurs involved made a restart 
after business failure, independent of the failure type, are more likely to be 
closed again than novice firms. The closure probability of restarts after closing a 
firm in financial distress is on average 37 percent higher than that of novice 
firms.5 Restarts after bankruptcy are faced with a probability of closure, which is 
raised by an average of 45 percent. They thus behave differently from other re-
starts because restarts after sale of shareholdings and restarts after closing a 
sound firm voluntarily do not differ from novice entrepreneurs’ firms in their 
probability of closure. Similarly, having entrepreneurial experience in the restart 
industry does not significantly affect the likelihood of closure, but having multi-
ple entrepreneurial experiences does, raising the probability of closure. 
Model B refers to the single risk specification in which only the risks of firm 
failure are pooled. The results are very similar to the previous single risk specifi-
cation, although closure is now is synonymous with failure. Restarts after sale of 
shareholdings do not differ significantly in their probability of failure 
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Table 4: Cox regression on firm closure 
Model A (Pooled exit types) Model B (Pooled failure types) Model C (Bankruptcy) 
Dependent variable: hazard rate 
Coefficient a 95%-confidence interval Coefficient 
a 95%-confidence 
interval Coefficient 
a 95%-confidence 
interval 
Exit experience (reference: no experience)        
 Sale of shareholdings -0.026 (0.027) -0.078 0.026 -0.011 (0.031) -0.071 0.049 0.048 (0.039) -0.028 0.125 
 Voluntary closure of sound firm 0.013 (0.041) -0.068 0.093 -0.075 (0.049) -0.172 0.021 -0.195*** (0.066) -0.324 -0.067 
 Voluntary closure of distressed firm 0.315*** (0.047) 0.224 0.406 0.319*** (0.051) 0.219 0.419 0.236*** (0.071) 0.097 0.375 
 Bankruptcy 0.370*** (0.030) 0.311 0.428 0.452*** (0.032) 0.389 0.516 0.534*** (0.042) 0.453 0.616 
Entrepreneurial within-industry experience 0.084* (0.046) -0.006 0.173 0.049 (0.052) -0.052 0.150 0.085 (0.066) -0.043 0.214 
Multiple entrepreneurial experiences 0.219*** (0.039) 0.142 0.296 0.215*** (0.044) 0.129 0.301 0.174*** (0.056) 0.064 0.285 
Initial economic situation b        
 Payment behavior (indicator: good) -0.282*** (0.009) -0.300 -0.264 -0.806*** (0.013) -0.832 -0.780 -0.319*** (0.016) -0.349 -0.288 
 Financial standing (indicator: care is advisable) 0.440*** (0.011) 0.418 0.462 0.694*** (0.012) 0.671 0.717 1.014*** (0.016) 0.982 1.046 
Higher education (indicator: graduate) -0.220*** (0.015) -0.249 -0.192 -0.309*** (0.018) -0.344 -0.273 -0.368*** (0.023) -0.414 -0.323 
Education unknown 0.165*** (0.008) 0.150 0.180 0.197*** (0.009) 0.180 0.215 0.218*** (0.012) 0.193 0.242 
Age of the entrepreneur(s) (reference: under 30 years)        
 30 to 39 years -0.142*** (0.009) -0.161 -0.124 -0.145*** (0.011) -0.167 -0.123 -0.118*** (0.016) -0.149 -0.087 
 40 to 49 years -0.111*** (0.010) -0.130 -0.091 -0.112*** (0.012) -0.135 -0.088 -0.104*** (0.017) -0.137 -0.072 
 50 to 59 years -0.029** (0.013) -0.054 -0.005 -0.065*** (0.015) -0.094 -0.036 -0.115*** (0.020) -0.155 -0.075 
 60 and older 0.084*** (0.020) 0.045 0.123 -0.030 (0.025) -0.079 0.018 -0.207*** (0.033) -0.272 -0.142 
 Age unknown -0.094*** (0.012) -0.117 -0.070 -0.178*** (0.014) -0.206 -0.149 -0.612*** (0.023) -0.658 -0.566 
Governance (indicator: team) -0.208*** (0.011) -0.230 -0.185 -0.348*** (0.014) -0.375 -0.321 -0.474*** (0.018) -0.510 -0.438 
Number of employees at start-up 0.031*** (0.002) 0.027 0.034 0.053*** (0.002) 0.048 0.057 0.102*** (0.003) 0.097 0.108 
Legal form (indicator: limited liability) 0.003 (0.009) -0.014 0.021 0.172*** (0.010) 0.152 0.192 0.707*** (0.013) 0.681 0.733 
Location (indicator: East-Germany) 0.061*** (0.008) 0.046 0.077 0.058*** (0.009) 0.040 0.076 0.211*** (0.012) 0.187 0.236 
χ2-Test on joint significance of the        
 Industry dummies c 2,296*** 1,803***  1,284***  
 Founding year dummies c 3,628*** 2,106***  80***  
Wald-test χ2 12,052*** 16,827***  14,182***  
Number of subjects / number of exits 345,179 / 91,750 345,179 / 66,684 345,179 / 35,566 
a Confidence levels: p < 0.01 = “***”, p < 0.05 = “**” and p < 0.1 = “*”. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
b Appraisal provided by Creditreform. 
c Not separately reported. 
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just as restarts after closing a sound firm voluntarily do not. Conversely, restarts 
after business failure are more likely to fail than other restarts or firms of novice 
entrepreneurs. However, the effects of the two failure types differ in amplitude. 
Compared to novice firms, restarts after closing a distressed firm voluntarily 
have a 25 percent higher risk of failure, while the risk for restarts after bank-
ruptcy is increased by 57 percent compared to novice firms. Besides, again it is 
found that the failure risk is not significantly affected by entrepreneurial within-
industry experience and entrepreneurs who have multiple experiences are faced 
with an increased risk of failure. Owing to these results, the first hypothesis is 
rejected. Experience that is, one might say, crowned with success, does not lower 
the risk of failure. Negative experience increases the failure risk. This means that 
the second hypothesis is definitely rejected; indeed, the opposite effect even 
arises. Nevertheless, the derived effect might be relevant if bankruptcy is sepa-
rated from the failure type aggregate. 
Comparing the results of the single failure risk regression with those of model 
C, which are the failure type specific estimates, helps to evaluate the findings 
above. Model C, which is based on failure due to bankruptcy, yet again shows 
that failure experience increases the risk of bankruptcy compared to novice 
firms. The additional bankruptcy risk is 26 percent for restarts after closing a 
distressed firm voluntarily, and is 71 percent for restarts after bankruptcy. Only 
restarts after closing a sound firm voluntarily have an 18 percent lower bank-
ruptcy risk. Restarts after sale of shareholdings do not significantly affect the 
bankruptcy risk. As seen twice above, experience gained within the same indus-
try in which the restart took place has no significant effect on the closure risk 
while multiple experiences lead to an extra risk again. 
Discussion of the findings 
The comparison of the results of the three applied models shows that specific 
firm characteristics mostly unambiguously increase or decrease the firms’ clo-
sure probability or failure risk. Only in a few cases, the same characteristic leads 
to different results as referred to, for example, senior entrepreneurs who increase 
the probability of closure but decrease the bankruptcy risk. With regard to the 
human capital indicators, it is a similar story. Apart from restarts after closing a 
sound firm voluntarily, which do not differ from novice firms in their closure 
probability but are less likely to fail, all other experience effects are unambigu-
ous. Experience that is based on the sale of shareholdings does not matter at all, 
but failure experience does. Restarts after a voluntary closure of a financially 
distressed firm, as well as restarts after bankruptcy are faced with a higher clo-
sure probability and also with an increased risk to fail again. 
However, why do failure experiences increase failure risks? Ucbasaran et al. 
(2006) argue that failed entrepreneurs are faced with pressure to take action be-
cause they have dragged themselves into a loss situation. This would force risk-
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seeking behavior, which may result in badly thought-out business activities with 
an increased risk of failure. Sheperd (2003) stresses the psychological approach 
in his explanation, in which the emotional fallout of previous failure prevails. A 
high level of grief reduces the ability to convert feedback information into 
knowledge, i.e. hampers learning, or even results in learning the wrong lessons 
(Sitkin 1992). Over-optimism plays an additional role. The findings of Stokes 
and Blackburn (2002) indicate that over-optimism is crucial for experienced en-
trepreneurs, too. An absolute majority of ex-entrepreneurs are motivated to start 
another enterprise because they are of the opinion that they have learned and will 
be able to make it work next time – even if they closed a venture unsuccessfully. 
However, the most likely reason for heightened failure risk is that individuals are 
prone to disavow their own failures. Mental defensive routines tempt previously 
failed entrepreneurs to blame unfortunate circumstances for their failure, rather 
than owning up to having failed due to their own inability (see Van den Steen 
2004 for a compilation of relevant citations). They thus do not learn about their 
lack of entrepreneurial talent as suggested by Jovanovic’s passive learning model 
(Jovanovic 1982). 
The finding that a business failure resulting in further failure is not the excep-
tion from the rule, but rather systematically dependent on the entrepreneurs, is 
much more alarming against the background of the described selection mecha-
nism, which should theoretically filter the failed entrepreneurs down to an elite. 
However, even this cream of the crop does not learn from their mistakes. This 
indicates that lowering the barriers for restart might increase the firm birth rate, 
by encouraging both first-time ventures and restarts, but it does not improve the 
sustainability of new businesses. 
There are limitations to consider arising from entrepreneurs evading the eco-
nomic consequences of failure. Entrepreneurs who went bankrupt are recorded in 
a public debtor register. With the entry, they are faced with difficulties like lim-
ited access to finance, as explained above, or with difficulties entering into con-
tracts at all, even in private affairs. In order to avoid the restrictions, a few use 
loopholes, for example by opening businesses in the name of relatives. In this 
way, they are not recorded as restarters but rather as novices. Thus, they tend to 
worsen the results for novices because, as we have seen, the probability of failing 
anew, whether by repeating the same mistakes that led to the failure or due to 
other factors, is increased. 
Summarizing conclusion 
The analysis herein addresses the question of whether personal entrepreneu-
rial experience promotes firm survival and therefore lowers a firm’s risk of clo-
sure. The question can even be understood as: does entrepreneurial experience 
affect the probability of business failure? Not every firm closure can be consid-
ered as a business failure. Thus, failures have been disentangled from the total 
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number of firm closures, and have been analyzed separately. There are two fail-
ure types, which can be identified: bankruptcy and the voluntary closure of a 
firm in financial distress. The results of the analysis indicate that experiences of 
success have no favorable effects when it comes to the probability of failure, 
apart from partly lowering the bankruptcy risk for a restart. Conversely, negative 
experience, namely previous entrepreneurial failure, raises the risk of failing 
again. This means that the derived hypotheses – experience initiates learning and 
thus more success – are mainly rejected. In particular, the assumption that ex-
perience of failure induces higher-level learning is dismissed. Indeed, the oppo-
site seems to be the case: failure experience increases the risk of further failure. 
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Notes 
1  This approximation to identify voluntary firm closures has been validated by real exit dates of 
voluntary closures obtained from the ZEW Founder Study (see Almus et al. 2001 for details on 
the survey). 
2  Within-industry experience is measured as previous entrepreneurial experience within the 
same NACE-4-digit category for each considered firm. 
3  Multiple entrepreneurial experiences are given if an entrepreneur has been involved in more 
than one firm prior to participation in the business considered. 
4  Using different graphical methods for testing reveals no grounds for a violation of the PH-
assumption. 
5  Table 4 reports coefficients rather than hazard rates. To obtain hazard rates the coefficients 
have to be exponentiated. Since exp(0.315) = 1.370 the closure probability increases by about 37 
percent. 
